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Abstract  
Anxiety about old age and mortality, a constant and cross-cultural reaction to the finitude of life and 
evanescence of youth, has fed multiple fantasies of immortality that frequently also incorporate the 
triumphant regeneration of the body. But while in the nineteenth century these fantasies, ungrounded on 
any scientific possibility, focused on the social and psychological disorientation and disruptions of the defeat 
of death and ageing, the late twentieth and twenty-first century fictions, invoking possible extrapolations 
of contemporary scientific and technological knowledge, have used the tropes of immortality and the 
rejuvenated body to serve either dystopian visions related with problematics of distribution of power, or to 
signify the utopian techno-optimist promises of trans-humanism. 
This paper will discuss these creative imaginings of the defeat of embodied decay using three speculative 
novels that position themselves as signposts along this spectrum: Walter Bessant’s The Inner House (1888), 
a conservative anti-utopian reflection on the social and cultural costs of immortality; Bruce Sterling’s Holy 
Fire (1996), a cyberpunk novel where access to permanent health and youth acts as a social divider between 
deserving elites and the masses condemned to grow old; and Cory Doctorow’s Down and out in the Magic 
Kingdom (2003), a post-singularity satirical novel where in a post-scarcity future society all enjoy the 
possibilities of body and life plasticity. 
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1. Why were we born if it wasn’t 
forever? 
In Declining to Decline, published more than twenty 
years ago, Margaret Gullette asserts that “age 
remains an impoverished concept” in much of the 
theorizing about discourse, “hidden in its supposed 
foundation in the body”, its constructiveness 
obscured by a master narrative of decline that sees 
ageing as ahistorical and pre-discursive, reduced to 
the protocols of the natural (pp. 201-202). Since 
these reflections on what Gullette characterized as 
the “Infancy of Age Theory”, much work has been 
done to cast into doubt that master narrative, 
questioning whether “decline becomes visible and 
speakable because the body ages” or because, as 
she suggests, “our culture finds it necessary for 
subjects that are young to be seen and be said to be 
aging” (1997, p. 201). In parallel, our understanding 
of what philosopher Martha Nussbaum has 
recently called the “projective disgust” towards the 
ageing body, has exposed how much of it is, in 
reality, a manifestation of the anguish caused by 
the knowledge that  
aging is the only disgust-stigma category into which 
every one of us will inevitably move, if we live long 
enough. (2017, p. 112) 
But unlike other variations of stigma attached to 
identity-based out-groups, grounded on fantasies 
of difference based on racial, gender, sexual or 
ability hierarchies, there is an inescapable reality to 
ageing in that it is taken to be a precursor and a 
visible sign of mortality. In the same way as youth 
is a value dependent on its own evanescence, 
ageing cannot be separated from the radical 
transience of life, signifying the certainty of the 
interruption of the project of making ourselves, 
summarised by Eugene Ionesco´s King Berenger’s 
desperate question “Why was I born if it wasn’t 
forever?” 
Equating the ageing body with anguish about death 
is, of course, a somewhat restrictive proposition. 
First, it assumes, somewhat uncritically, the familiar 
axiom that it is the end of life that gives it 
significance, and that death itself (as separate from 
the process of dying) is undesirable and undesired. 
Philosophers like Anthony Brueckner and John 
Martin Fisher, revising the asymmetrical attitude to 
non-existence identified by Epicurus and Lucretius, 
have discussed why death, which no one has 
personally experienced and should, therefore, be 
categorised as an “experiential blank” (2009, p. 27), 
is perceived as bad for the individual who dies in 
ways that pre-natal non-existence is not, even if we 
have no expectations of any kind of afterlife. 
Answering the Epicureans’ arguments against the 
fear of death, they turn to Thomas Nagel’s view 
that posthumous non-existence is perceived as a 
privation of experienced good things in ways that 












the uncontroversial and commonsensical 
awareness that if most humans probably regret not 
living longer, the same kind of regret is not usually 
projected into a desire for having been born earlier. 
Secondly, besides the obvious fact that one may die 
before one’s body falters, fantasy projections of an 
ideal life without death usually also preclude aged 
bodies. No one would envy the Struldbrugs of 
Luggnagg, the immortals in Gulliver’s Travels who, 
though “exempt from that universal calamity of 
human nature” and living forever, are far from 
being the “happy people of a happy nation where 
every child hath at last a chance for being 
immortal” since they become senile and socially 
rejected, are stripped of their assets at 80 and 
eventually lose their memory (Swift, Part III, 
chapter 10). What fictions of immortality tend to 
project as ideal is the end of death and the 
competency associated with a youthful body. 
The tension between these two desires – youthful 
vigour and a transcendence of what Swift called the 
calamity of human nature – explains why most 
fictions of longevity, predicated either on the 
stopping of the ageing process or the creation of 
methods of rejuvenation, also aspire to immortality 
and why narratives of immortality also incorporate 
the triumphant defeat of the destiny of the 
biological body. These linkages are naturally framed 
by the horizons of the possibility of a specific 
timeframe. In the Anglophone tradition, fantasies 
of immortality emerging in the nineteenth century, 
when this project could only be imagined by the 
introduction of some unexplained almost magical 
novum, question the desirability of the defeat of 
ageing and death focusing mostly on the 
disorientation and disruptions brought about by 
these inversions of the natural, as is the case of 
Mary Shelley’s “The Mortal Immortal” (1833) and 
Walter Bessant’s The Inner House (1888). Some of 
these preoccupations also emerge in some late 
twentieth and twenty-first-century science fiction, 
framed by the techno-optimism of the singularity 
theory and by the contemporary debate about the 
post-human condition, indebted to the inheritance 
of the Cartesian dualities of cyberpunk. Here the 
tropes of immortality and the rejuvenated body 
serve to interrogate both the problematics of 
distribution of power created by access to 
immortality and issues related to the survival of the 
sense of selfhood. This paper discusses and teases 
out these approaches by contrasting the 
imagination of immortality in a nineteenth-century 
text, the Inner House, with recent science fiction 
novels that exemplify different dynamics of post-
singularity immortality: Bruce Sterling’s Holy Fire 
(1996); Accelerando by Charles Stross (2005); and 
Down and out in the Magic Kingdom (2003) by Cory 
Doctorow. 
2. Living after the Great Discovery 
If in Mary Shelley’s short story “The Mortal 
Immortal” (1833) the protagonist’s defeat of death 
is unintended and personally disastrous, as Winzy, 
the alchemist’s apprentice who drinks an 
immortality potion thinking it is the cure for love, 
comes to see the results of his eternal youth as a 
destroyer of his personal happiness and family 
harmony, The Inner House, published 55 years later, 
extends the investigation of the consequences of 
immortality from the domain of the personal and 
the confessional to that of the social and the 
political. 
The narrative opens at the moment the discovery 
of “the Prolongation of Vital Energy” is revealed in 
a lecture at the Royal Institution given by Professor 
Schwarzbaum, who intends to donate the anti-
ageing chemical formula to “the world”. We soon 
realise that “the world” will diverge from the 
generous discoverer in two significant ways. First, 
while the professor explains to his audience that 
the medicine is intended to “prolong life only until 
a person has enjoyed everything they desire”, 
expecting that after two or three centuries “you 
would, of your own accord put aside the aid of 
science” and, contented and resigned, “sink into 
the Tomb” (p. 11), when the story jumps hundreds 
of years into the future we understand that “the 
Great Discovery” has been used exclusively as an 
instrument of immortality. 
Secondly, when we visit that future, we understand 
that the discriminatory clauses proposed by the 
professor, namely that longevity should be offered 
only to “the salt of the earth, the flower of 
mankind” and that those whose 
lives could never become anything but a burden to 
themselves and to the rest of the world – the crippled, 
the criminal, the poor, the imbecile, the incompetent, 
the stupid, and the frivolous [...] would live out their 
allotted lives and die (pp. 10-11) 
had been reinterpreted and expanded. In the 
immediate aftermath of the discovery, all the 
elderly had been wiped out in the genocide known 
as the Great Slaughter, and only the young had 
benefitted from the Great Discovery. In the 
following centuries, no one had chosen to die, and 
no one had been born, except on the rare occasions 
when the state had allowed a birth to replace an 
accidental death. An authoritarian society, 
controlled by the organ known as the College of 
Physicians headed by an Arch Physician, had 
emerged, one where everyone lives by a collective 
schedule and acts, looks and thinks in exactly the 
same way. Having first taken the Arcanum, as the 
longevity formula is now known, at a young age 
(twenty-five for women and thirty for men), the 
citizens of the ageless and deathless utopia live 
without personal property, joy, curiosity or thirst 
for knowledge. In this world, which anticipates the 












narrator1 informs the reader, “Art, Leaning, Science 
– other than Physics, Biology and Medicine – all 
gradually decayed and died away” and the “old 
foolish pursuit of literature” had also been 
abandoned since “no longer anxious about their 
past or their future”, these new humans were 
“contented to dwell in the present” (p. 28). Thus, 
the narrator assures us, “true happiness has been 
achieved” as “life has been reduced to its simplest 
form […] nothing to hope, nothing to fear” (p. 26) 
and, as the storyline suggests, nothing to feel and 
nothing to love. When rebellion comes, it is led by 
Christina, a young girl whose exceptional birth had 
been allowed as a replacement for one accidental 
death. She is allowed to live in an abandoned Art 
Museum no one visits, with an old man who had 
escaped the Great Slaughter. Having no personal 
memory of the past, her contact with its artistic 
representations in her nightly meanderings through 
the empty galleries awakens in the young girl a 
passion for the romanticised elegance of the pre-
immortality days when, as the portraits suggest, 
there were ladies with beautiful dresses and heroic 
sailors and soldiers who knew they were better 
than other men. Sharing these imagined memories 
with a small group of acquaintances, former 
aristocrats and military men who actually 
remember, kindles a feeble rebellion that, having 
failed, leads the nostalgic group to leave the Utopia 
of Immortality and Equality and retreat to a faraway 
island to attempt to replay the roles they half 
remember, to live fully, with pleasure and love and 
then to die without regrets. 
The undisguised conservative undertone of the 
narrative does not obfuscate this very early literary 
presence of a very influential trope in immortality 
fiction – living forever is tedious and soul-crushing. 
This is the proposition defended by moral 
philosopher Bernard Williams who, although 
distancing himself from the tenet that it is the 
inescapable reality of death that gives meaning to 
life, argues that immortality would be intolerable, 
based on the notion of continuity of the self, 
subject to the same unchanging desires and goals 
such as those one acquires in the course of a finite 
life; if such immortal humans retained a sense of 
selfhood, argues Williams, contentment would be 
necessarily elusive as an endless cycle “of 
supposedly satisfying states and activities” would 
prove unendurably boring to anyone who remained 
conscious of himself and “who had acquired a 
character, interests, tastes and impatiences in the 
course of living” (Williams, 1993, p. 87). One might 
argue nonetheless, as John Martin Fisher does, that 
these conclusions assume a sense of permanence 
                                                             
1 The narrator is not a neutral observer; he is, as the reader 
only discovers half-way through the text, the former 
Suffragant (the second rank in the power hierarchy), 
and unchangeability of the self that rules out the 
possibility that a future I, while recognizably the 
same, might change in response to future 
circumstances and either acquire new interests or 
continue enjoying other non-“self-exhausting”, 
repeatable pleasures (Fisher, 2009, p. 85). 
In contemporary speculative fictions of immortality 
this paradox – how to reconcile the identity 
condition with the attractiveness condition (being 
the same and finding pleasure in a never-ending 
life) – has been a central problem examined from 
many angles. The premises they explore are 
obviously different; while narratives of immortality 
written in the nineteenth-century could not escape 
the shadow of the quasi-magical and unexplained 
fantastic defeat of the laws of biology, by the late 
twentieth-century the utopian mythologies of post-
singularity discourses would provide a fertile 
terrain for imagining the transcendence of what 
futurist Ray Kurzweil calls our “1.0 biological 
bodies”, over which we will gain power so that “our 
mortality will be in our hands” and “we will be able 
to live as long as we want.” (Kurzweil, 2006, p. 9). 
This liberation of the body from its finitude and 
frailty is frequently imagined either as a function of 
medical and technological enhancement and fusion 
with non-biological elements or by extending the 
Cartesian dichotomy to imagine a self that can 
move away from its original “meat machine” to 
inhabit a plurality of disposable and redoable 
bodies. 
3. Technoscience and posthuman 
lives 
In Holy Fire (1996), Bruce Sterling distances himself 
from some of the cyberpunk tropes he is associated 
with and invests in a purely carbon-based 
immortality, choosing to investigate the challenges 
Williams so clearly identified and to revisit 
Bessant’s agenda, bringing to the fore the new 
power relations and social landscapes brought 
about by extreme longevity and immortality. 
The novel draws a late twenty-first-century world 
dominated by a political-medical-industrial 
complex devoted to the ultimate pursuit of life 
extension for deserving citizens, aiming to prolong 
life until a cure for mortality is achieved. Controlling 
most of the world’s economy and biomedicine, 
employing fifteen per cent of the world’s 
population and topping all other government 
expenses, it is mostly dedicated to gerontological 
research. In this global order, the distribution of 
power is measured by access to longevity. While 
“once upon a time having money almost 
guaranteed good health”, now worthiness has 
whose narrative is a retrospective account of an episode of 












replaced wealth (p. 49). For the undeserving, 
dedicated to the pursuit of “irresponsible” body-
destroying pleasures, there is no escape from 
natural ageing and death. A medical surveillance 
panopticon determines each individual’s 
worthiness; as Martin, a 96-year-old film director 
denied rejuvenation treatments, explains:  
when you go in for a checkup they take your blood 
and hair and DNA and they map every trace of every 
little thing you’ve done to yourself. 
Unless you are “a little tin saint” your records, 
splashed “all over the net”, condemn you to your 
biological destiny (p. 11). 
If, on the other hand, you are a productive, 
responsible and unquestioning supporter of the 
medical state and have “objectively demonstrated 
your firm will to live” and your “tenacious approach 
to longevity” as demonstrated by your medical 
records (p. 47), you are rewarded with permanent 
medical upgrades and rejuvenation treatments that 
keep you looking and feeling youngish. 
On the margins of this elite gerontocracy, pockets 
of non-compliers (the American Amish, for 
example, who cling to the natural ways) and the 
“real” young, struggling to be “vivacious” (that is 
innovative and creative), have attempted, with 
little success, to sustain alternative life choices 
outside the dominant order. 
The narrative centres on the experience of Mia, a 
member of the elite, a 94-year-old medical 
economist from California, living a meticulously 
planned existence from which pleasure has long 
been eradicated. Describing herself as a post-sexual 
and post-womanly technochrome, she summarises 
her life: 
I don’t have lovers [...] I don’t kiss anyone, I don’t hug 
anyone, I don’t cheer anyone up. (p. 16);  
I look at screens and study grant procedures and 
weight results from research programmes. (p. 13) 
“I’m a functionary” she concludes. (p. 13) 
This exemplary behaviour renders her the perfect 
candidate for the ultimate experimental treatment 
which will grant her biological youth, restoration of 
all metabolic drives and immortality – on condition 
she lets herself be examined and constantly 
medically monitored after the procedure. “You 
are,” her doctor explains, “going to be a ninety-five-
year-old woman who can look, act and feel like a 
twenty-year-old girl” (p. 57). 
Thus the 20-year-old girl that emerges from the 
treatment is not exactly the youthful-looking 
nonagenarian woman who volunteered for it. The 
difference is not only located in the body but in the 
double-edged mind, now both old and young. 
While she certainly retains her sense of self, she 
recognises that she is not the same. She can let the 
old self resurface and pretend that not much has 
changed, but being “the Mia thing”, a “meek... and 
accommodating bundle of habits” (p. 63), is no 
longer tolerable. 
“Something has snapped,” she recognises when 
contemplating her old life.  
This is not my place. This is nowhere. I can’t live like 
this. This isn’t living. I’m out of here.” (p. 66).  
Following the new impulsiveness and desires of the 
new body and new double consciousness, calling 
herself Maya, the once passive Mia escapes the 
medical surveillance team and heads to Europe, 
looking for “holy fire”, an excitement about life and 
its possibilities she had never missed before. 
It is when surrounded by what Teresa Magnum calls 
“metaphors of aging” (2002, p. 76), expressed by 
the centuries-old landscapes of Praha, Frankfurt 
and Stuttgart, that, somewhat paradoxically, Maya 
finds avenues of defiant self-expression in the 
company of communities of irreverent and 
bohemian young anarchic artificers who, unable to 
defeat the power of the artificially young, seek a 
kind of immortality in virtuality and occasionally 
find in suicide the most radical gesture of protest 
against the gerontocratic order. 
Defying laws and social mores, experimenting new 
types of pleasure and sexual delectations, 
Maya/Mia’s embodied performance of youth will 
eventually fall prey to the paradox identified by 
John Fisher Martin. Her double consciousness 
clashes with her newly obtained desires. Her 20-
year-old self knows what her 94 years have taught 
her. Being both the same and not the same turns 
her potentially immortal life into both a continuous 
and a discontinuous experience. Finding no long-
term satisfaction in her performance of new, 
liberated youth, she returns home and attempts to 
live disconnected from the system that gave her 
what she no longer feels she really wants, knowing 
full well that this break will mean ageing and 
eventually death. At the end of the novel, she finds 
a private and self-reflexive pleasure in 
photographing the processes of ageing of the 
Amish, a gesture of reconciliation with the natural 
processes of body decay and death, which she now 
has chosen as her future. 
If Holy Fire projects immortality on a stable 
biological, if radically modifiable, body, novels 
which draw more directly on the Singularity 
metaphors tend to depend on a detachment 
between the mind and a body which is not only 
modifiable but replaceable, sometimes even 
projected into several serial non-atomistic modes 
of being. Some of these techno-utopias lack, as 
Steven Shaviro points out, a modicum of 
“existential anguish”, creating naively optimistic 
post-human vistas (2009, p 109). 
Cory Doctorow’s Down and Out in the Magic 
Kingdom (2003) is not in that category, offering a 
more reflective contemplation of the promises of 












satirical gaze. It takes the reader to a twenty-
second-century post-scarcity world based on the 
distribution of Free Energy to all, guaranteed by a 
global entity known as the Bitchun Society. 
Under this utopian order, basic material conditions 
are assured to all; there is no poverty and no 
economical sources of inequality, work is strictly 
voluntary, and a vehicle for self-expression and 
pleasure rather than a condition of survival, and 
both sickness and death have been eradicated 
thanks to a combination of nano-production, mind–
uploading and body cloning. 
In this ad-hocracy with no central authority, status 
is based not on money or the value of material 
objects but on individual reputation, represented 
by Whuffie points attributed to each individual 
according to their socially useful endeavours. The 
points are automatically known to all as individual 
scores are accessed via the networked brain 
implants all citizens have, establishing a new type 
of social hierarchy based on a “likeability” status. 
This ironic portrait is enhanced by the location of 
the plot, a Disney World where different groups 
struggle for simulacra of power based on aesthetic 
values and the popularity of their creations. 
Involuntary death has been abolished, age is a 
flexible concept as one may choose the years of the 
body one carries, and life is as long as one wants it 
to be. Immortality is seen as potentially rewarding 
and filled with delights, as Julius, the more than 
100-year-old narrator, initially describes when he 
mentions his many achievements – the ten 
languages he has learned, the three symphonies he 
has composed, his four doctorates, all enjoyed, by 
choice, in a 40-year-old looking body. 
But this listing of the joys of unending possibilities 
notwithstanding, it is the re-visitation of Williams´ 
conditions for an appealing immortality that most 
of the novel addresses, dwelling on the double 
conundrum of the potential boredom of eternity 
and the permanence and stability of the self. 
The challenges of sustaining an interesting never-
ending life are assumed to be so inevitable that a 
solution has been provided – the practice of 
deadheading. This is best described as a temporary 
death from which one may re-emerge anytime one 
chooses as one leaves one’s conscience backed up 
ready to unload into a fresh body should one want 
to try and live again. This widely used practice is 
recommended to those who feel they have seen all 
there is to see, done all there is to do and crave a 
permanent death. 
This is the case of Keep A-Movin’ Dan, a friend of 
Julius’ who, having lived his very active long years 
in a 25-year-old body, looks at the long arch of 
eternity with panic: “I think that if I’m still alive in 
ten thousand years, I’m going to be crazy as hell.” 
Asking “You really think there is going to be 
anything recognizably human in a hundred 
centuries?” he concludes,  
Me, I´m not interested in being a post-person. I´m 
going to wake up one day and I´m going to say, ‘Well, 
I guess I’ve seen about enough’ and that will be my 
last day. (p. 13)  
When his friend Julius suggests, “why not just 
deadhead for a few centuries, see if there’s 
anything that takes your fancy and if not, back to 
sleep for a few more?” the proposition does not 
appeal to Dan, who is resolved to “stop moving, 
stop seeking, stop kicking, and have it done with” 
when the day comes “when I don’t have anything 
left to do, except stop.” (p. 13) 
The ironic limitations of the utopian promises of 
what Julius had called the “cure for death” (p. 7) 
does not stop here, as the text revisits the 
disembodied mind trope in new ways, introducing 
a degree of instability in the process of body 
assignment and mind uploading that is far from 
problem-free. 
Early in the novel, Julius is murdered, a futile and 
inexplicable exercise because of the assured 
reversibility of the act. This is, in fact, his third death 
and as he admits, it is becoming increasingly easier 
to recover from it. “The first time I died”, in a diving 
accident, he remembers, the process of making 
mind-backups was still painfully slow: “it took 
almost a day, and had to be undertaken at a special 
clinic”, and people like him did not do it regularly. 
The memory his new body received was therefore 
incomplete, with a couple of weeks missing, a void 
hanging so heavily on his sense of “rebirth, that it 
had taken him almost a year to find and reinvent 
himself” (p. 34). 
His second death, ten years after the first one, this 
time of a massive heart attack, could have been 
equally traumatic since he had been lax in backing 
up again, but this time he was helped by a 
“computer-generated précis of the events of the 
missing interval” and was followed by a counsellor 
until he felt at home again in his rebooted body (p. 
35). 
Armed with that experience, his casual dismissal of 
the experience of being killed – “Sure, I'd been 
murdered, but what had it cost me? A few days of 
"unconsciousness" while they decanted my backup 
into my new body” (p. 49) – hides a new concern 
that will come to haunt him after the procedure. 
It is not that he agrees with the ontological doubts 
of his old friend Dan, who calls into question the 
sameness of his copy, clinging to the belief that 
“there is a difference between you and an exact 
copy of you” and that “being destroyed and 
recreated” cannot possibly be the same as “not 
being destroyed at all” (p. 41) since he is sure that 
he feels like himself, but that he is haunted by a 
heightened awareness of the loss of memory. If 
everyone’s “decanting” is limited by the date of 












sure of the continuity of the self if something 
important in shaping that self might be missing, 
something that cannot be re-lived by mere 
enunciation of its factuality? 
It is this idea of loss of lived time and experience 
that paralyses him when he begins to suffer from a 
radical malfunction – his mind goes off-line at 
unexpected times, depriving him of all the 
knowledge and connections it has accumulated, 
leaving him with “no tone in my cochlea indicating 
a new file in my public directory” (p. 69), no access 
to statistics and data. 
The cause of this condition, his doctor explains, is a 
defect in the “brain-machine interface” installed 
when he was restored after his last death. Curing 
the malfunction would not be difficult, involving a 
rebooting into a new clone refreshed from his last 
backup, nevertheless implying the complete loss of 
a whole year of memories, and this he finds he 
cannot accept. “I was going to lose [...] it all,” he 
reflects, “all of it, good and bad. Every moment 
flensed away.” “I couldn’t do it” (p. 126). 
His refusal, based on the sense of the permanence 
of the self-grounded on lived emotions, inverts the 
notions of life and death as Julius comes to see the 
recommendations of his doctor and friends as an 
attempt to kill him in order to save him. The choice 
before him seems to be between a complete 
breakdown of his brain-machine interface, 
condemning him to be permanently “offline, 
outcast, malfunctioning” (p. 105), and the loss of 
the experiences he most values and that he 
identifies with his sense of deep identity. 
Besides, with Dan planning to take a lethal injection 
soon, the procedure would erase his best friend 
completely from his memory. And who will he be if 
he does not remember the emotion of the 
existence and loss of a friendship he so values? 
Torn by the options before him, he tries to escape 
from the responsibility of the decision by drowning 
himself in a lake, hoping to be refreshed without 
choosing it and consciously “shutting out the last 
years of my best friend’s life” (p. 193). This pathetic 
attempt to “abdicate”, as he puts it, fails (as he is 
rescued before he dies) and he is left with the 
impossible decision between what he sees as two 
kinds of quasi-death. 
At the end of the novel, Dan decides not to die, 
opting for long-term deadheading: “I’ll poke my 
head in every century or so, just to see what’s what, 
but if nothing really stupendous crops up, I´ll take 
the long ride out,” he explains (p. 204). Julius, on 
the other hand, decides to drop off earth and take 
himself to space, leaving behind his increasingly 
obsolete back-up and relying instead on his own 
words, writing “long hand a letter to the me that I’ll 
                                                             
2 See also the American National Academy of Medicine’s 
Healthy Longevity Grand Challenge, and the Sens Research 
be when it’s restored into a clone somewhere, 
somewhen” (p. 206). This letter is the novel the 
reader has just finished reading, a gamble on a 
sense of permanence projected into a future so 
distant it can hardly be imagined, neither refusing 
nor accepting the desirability of non-death. 
Sherryl Vint has argued that  
science fiction is particularly suited to exploring 
questions of post-human futures, since it is a 
discourse that allows us to concretely imagine other 
concepts of bodies and selves, estranging our 
commonplace perception of reality.” (2007, p 19) 
In the case of our anxieties about ageing and death, 
while real-life research is being done into the 
possibilities of extreme longevity (the Calico 
Longevity Lab is one of the many initiatives 
operating today)2, thought-experiments such as 
those discussed here may be productive 
mechanisms to explore the consequences of our 
conscious and unconscious desires to transcend the 
limits of our existence that we cannot control. 
Divided between Plato’s advice of acceptance, in 
his famous recommendation that we should 
“practise dying”, and the scientifically grounded 
utopias and fantasies about the cure for death, 
these fictions of immortality offer us a landscape of 
“what ifs” that may help us work through ethical 
challenges of both the personal and public kind and 
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